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KEY TRONIC v. UNITED STATES-THE CASE




In 1980, Congress responded to the burgeoning number of disposal
sites contaminated with hazardous waste by enacting the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).1
CERCLA aims to "protect human health and the environment, 2 by en-
couraging swift and effective cleanup of hazardously contaminated sites
and by placing the cost of cleanup on the parties responsible for such
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)). The legislative history of CERCLA may be found in S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The legislation was drafted hastily in response to public
opinion and is marred by compromises and vague terminology. United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); see also William Harris Frank & Timothy B. Atkeson, Superfund: Litigation and
Cleanup (BNA Special Report) 1-2 (1985) (discussing how President Carter declared a
state of emergency in response to the public health hazards resulting from the Love Canal
disaster in 1978, and how this mobilized Congress to enact legislation quickly to combat
the problem of hazardous dumpsites); Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1982) (examining interpretation difficulties arising from the
haste with which CERCLA was drafted).
2. H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N, 2835, 2848; see also Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1443-44 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that payment of response costs by Potentially Re-
sponsible Parties ("PRPs") is important in achieving CERCLA's goals of quick cleanup of
hazardous sites); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio) (recognizing
that one of CERCLA's key purposes is to aid the federal government in promptly cleaning
hazardous waste sites), recons. denied, 22 Envt Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1447 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
The Senate Committee Report articulated five basic purposes for enacting CERCLA. S.
REP. No. 848, at 13. They were: (1) to make those responsible for environmental harm,
damage, or injury caused by hazardous chemical materials pay the price of their actions;
(2) to provide funds to pay for cleanup where a responsible party fails to clean or cannot
afford to clean up due to lack of funds or cannot be found; (3) to support such cleanups
upon the contributions of those who have benefited from the use of hazardous substances
in the past; (4) to provide the federal government with ample authority to assist in cleaning
hazardous waste sites; and (5) to compensate those who have suffered damages due to
hazardous wastes. Id.
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contamination.3 The federal government effectuates these goals by either
initiating the cleanup itself,4 or by ordering the potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) to clean the contamination.5
Making PRPs initially liable for cleanup causes parties who are not re-
sponsible, or not solely responsible, for the contamination to shoulder the
cleanup or "response" costs preliminarily.6 Section 107(a)(4) of CER-
CLA, however, permits both the federal government and private parties
to file contribution actions to recover response or cleanup costs7 from
3. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990) (stating that two main purposes of CERCLA are "prompt cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party"), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); Patricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of Financial
Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139,
142 (discussing EPA's power to place responsibility of payment for cleanup on responsible
parties).
4. CERCLA § 104(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988). Whenever there is a release
or a "substantial threat" that a hazardous substance posing a substantial threat may be
released, the government may initiate cleanup of the site. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988) (allowing the federal government to obtain a judicial
order to make a party cleanup). Under CERCLA, the executive branch's second option,
as opposed to initiating the cleanup, is to compel a private party to undertake a response
action for any waste which is endangering or threatening to endanger the environment. Id.
The party chosen to undertake the cleanup action is held strictly liable. Id. § 9607(a) (stat-
ing that responsible parties "shall be liable") (emphasis added).
6. See id. § 9607. The EPA may select a PRP to undertake the cleanup action from
the following groups of PRPs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for [costs of
removal or remedial action].
Id. Given the EPA's latitude in deciding who it may charge with cleaning up a contami-
nated site, an entity minimally responsible for the contamination, such as a transporter,
may be selected. Id. § 9607(a)(4); see id. § 9601(26) (defining transport). As defined by
CERCLA, "[tihe terms 'respond' or 'response' means [sic] remove, removal, remedy, and
remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') in-
clude enforcement activities related thereto." Id. § 9601(25).
7. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B). For the purposes of this Note, the author will, based on
personal convention, use the terms "cleanup" costs and "response" costs interchangeably.
1995] Attorneys' Fees under CERCLA
parties identified as PRPs.8 In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,9 the
Supreme Court addressed whether attorneys' fees constitute a recover-
able response cost in private party response recovery actions. 10
Despite Congress' attempt to clarify CERCLA in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),11 there has
been a substantial amount of litigation over whether CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(B), the provision applicable specifically to private parties, al-
lows for the recovery of attorneys' fees. 2 Five circuit courts addressed
this issue; the Sixth and Eighth Circuits allowed the recovery of attor-
8. See id. § 9607(a)(1-4). The section of CERCLA from which private parties are
given the authority to seek contribution from other PRPs is § 107(a)(4)(B), which states in
relevant part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section...
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of
(4) ... shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan ....
Id. see, e.g., United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D. Mich.
1988) (holding that plaintiffs could recover costs incurred in cleanup actions), aff'd, sub
nom, United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1897 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(finding that plaintiff is entitled to recover all litigation costs incurred by plaintiff in an
action to recover cleanup costs), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
and cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
9. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
10. Id. at 1963.
11. Congress overhauled CERCLA in 1986 by passing the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act. Pub. L. No. 99-449, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). One of the issues Congress addressed in reauthorizing
CERCLA in 1986 was the issue of attorneys' fees, but the addition of the term "enforce-
ment activity" did little to resolve the debate of whether "necessary costs" includes the
recovery of attorneys' fee under § 107(a)(4)(B). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) and
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (failing to clearly define "necessary costs" and "enforcement
activities").
12. See, e.g., Hastings Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp.
228, 233 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (finding attorneys' fees recoverable); Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp.
1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (finding attorneys' fees not recoverable); Pease & Curren
Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding fees recover-
able); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 66 (D.N.H. 1990) (finding fees not recover-
able); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4820, at *17
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (same), recons. denied, 766 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1991),
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neys' fees,' 3 while the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits denied recovery.' 4
The Supreme Court finally resolved the conflict in Key Tronic, holding
that recoverable response costs under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) do
not include attorneys' fees.' 5
The facts of Key Tronic are paradigmatic of most private party cost
recovery actions under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). 16 The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) identified Key Tronic Corporation (Key
Tronic) as one of several parties, including the United States Air Force,
responsible for chemically contaminating a landfill in the state of Wash-
ington during the 1970s. 17 The chemicals leached into the soil and
poisoned the water supply of the surrounding area.' 8 In settling a lawsuit
the EPA brought against Key Tronic, Key Tronic agreed to pay 4.2 million
dollars into the EPA cleanup fund.' 9 Key Tronic then sued the Air Force
and other PRPs under CERCLA to recover a portion of its 4.2 million
dollar commitment, including attorneys' fees.2° The attorneys' fees Key
Tronic sought to recover included the cost associated with litigating its
case, as well as the legal expenses it incurred from searching for other
responsible parties and negotiating its settlement with the EPA.21
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washing-
ton determined that Key Tronic could recover all attorneys' fees under
13. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th
Cir. 1990) (finding fees recoverable under CERCLA), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991);
Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.) (same), reh'g, en banc, denied, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14303, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 (1993).
14. FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847-48 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
litigation-related attorneys' fees not recoverable under CERCLA); In re Hemingway
Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934 (1st Cir.) (finding attorneys' fees not recoverable), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993); Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020
(9th Cir. 1993) (same).
15. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (holding attorneys' fees not recoverable under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) because there is not an explicit statutory grant allowing for the
reward of attorneys' fees to private parties in response recovery actions).
16. As in other cases dealing with hazardous waste cleanup, the party identified and
charged with the cleanup of the site in Key Tronic was not, or at least not solely, responsi-
ble for the contamination. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1963; see, e.g., FMC Corp., 998 F.2d at
844 (involving the cleanup of a site contaminated by various corporations, but owned by
Aero Industries at the time of the charged cleanup); Donahey, 987 F.2d at 1252-53 (involv-
ing the cleanup of a site contaminated by a lessee of Bogle, who then sold the land to
Donahey, the person charged with cleanup by the government); Stanton Rd., 984 F.2d at
1016 (involving the cleanup of Stanton's property, but caused by Lohrey Enterprises);
General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1416 (involving the cleanup of a site charged to General Electric,
but which had been originally owned and contaminated by Litton).
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section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA,22 holding that the legal expenses Key
Tronic incurred were necessary costs of response compensable under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). 23 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding, finding the lan-
guage of section 107(a)(4)(B) insufficiently specific to permit the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees.
2 4
In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court, following the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion and the emerging trend in the majority of federal circuits addressing
the issue, held that section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA does not cover at-
torneys' fees associated with litigation.25 The majority opinion, authored
by Justice Stevens, adhered to the traditional analysis regarding the
recoverability of attorneys' fees. His opinion concluded that the language
of section 107(a)(4)(B) fails to grant the recovery of attorneys' fees ex-
plicitly, as the "American Rule" requires. 26 Conversely, Justice Scalia ar-
gued, in his dissent, that the language of section 107(a)(4)(B) meets the
American Rule's demands regarding the award of legal fees.27
This Note first examines the long-standing "American Rule" on fee
shifting and shows how this rule permits a victorious party to recover
attorneys' fees in certain instances. Next, this Note reviews the conflict-
22. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 865, 871-73 (E.D. Wash. 1991)
(holding that the attorneys' fees for all three services at issue in the case were recoverable
under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) because the provision, in allowing for the recovery of
"necessary response costs," grants with sufficient clarity the recovery of attorneys' fees),
rev'd, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993).
23. See Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 869-72 (holding that the three types of attorneys'
fees at issue in the case - fees for prosecuting the action, for searching for other PRPs,
and for negotiating the consent decree with the EPA - are all recoverable under CER-
CLA § 107(a)(4)(B) because they constitute "necessary response costs").
24. See Key Tronic v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing the dis-
trict court's ruling, the Circuit court held that no attorneys' fees, of any kind, are recover-
able under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B)), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994);
infra text accompanying notes 88-117 (discussing circuit court decisions rejecting recovery
of attorneys' fees under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B)).
25. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1966-67 (1994) (holding
that attorneys' fees associated with litigation are not recoverable under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B) absent lack of specific congressional authorization). Three of the five cir-
cuits addressing the issue, the Ninth, First, and Tenth, found CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) in-
sufficiently explicit to justify rewarding attorneys' fees to private parties. See supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text (outlining holdings of the circuits which have addressed
whether attorneys' fees are recoverable under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B)).
26. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965 (holding that private parties may not recover attor-
neys' fees for litigation if such fees are not specifically granted by CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B)), as is required by the "American [R]ule") (quoting Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 185-86 (1976)).
27. Id. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority misinterpreted the
American Rule by requiring more than mere specificity, but rather the inclusion of the
actual words "attorney's fees" in order to allow their recovery).
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ing decisions among the Appellate Courts regarding recovery of legal
fees under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). After examining the reason-
ing of the federal circuits, this Note provides a detailed analysis of both
the majority and dissenting opinions in Key Tronic. Finally, this Note
concludes that the Supreme Court's holding misinterpreted precedent
and is inconsistent with the language of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B)
itself, as well as the American Rule and the legislative purposes underly-
ing the enactment of CERCLA.
I. THE HISTORY OF FEE SHIFTING
A. The American Rule: Winner Pays All
Unlike the English legal system where the losing party reimburses pre-
vailing party's costs, American jurisprudence requires the winning litigant
to bear the financial burden of any courtroom success.28 This concept,
known as the "American Rule," evolved out of the common law29 and
was first recognized and adopted by the Supreme Court in 1796.10 In
Arcambel v. Wiseman,3 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he general
practice in the United States is in oppo[s]ition to [fee shifting]; and even
if that practice were not [s]trictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the
re[s]pect of the court, till [sic] it is changed, or modified, by [s]tatute. 32
In so stating, the Supreme Court recognized that the legislature, not the
28. The rule that each party in a legal action be responsible for paying their respective
attorneys' fees is known as the "American Rule." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429
(1983); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 247-48
(1975) (holding that the "American Rule" requires that a statute specifically and explicitly
grant recovery of attorneys' fees).
29. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247. At common law, fees generally were not allowed and
federal courts were to follow the practice of the courts of the state in which they set with
regard to awarding attorneys' fees. Id. at 247-48. There were few statutes in the early days
of the United States that dealt with attorneys' fees on a national level. By 1800, such
statutes either had been repealed or had expired. See id. at 848-49 n.19 (describing the
statutes in effect at the time).
30. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796) (holding that the judiciary would
not create a rule regarding recovery of attorneys' fees independent of Congress).
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis in original). Courts have consistently reinforced the position the
Supreme Court enunciated in Arcambel. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185
(1976) (refusing recovery of attorneys' fees under § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act); F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1974) (denying
recovery of attorneys' fees under the Miller Act); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967) (holding that absent explicit statutory authorization,
attorneys' fees are not recoverable); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878) (hold-
ing attorneys' fees not recoverable in bankruptcy case); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 373 (1851) (disallowing recovery of attorneys' fees by plaintiffs as compensa-
tory or punitive damages).
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judiciary, holds the authority to create exceptions to the American
Rule.
33
Although the statutory genesis of the American Rule can be traced to
legislation enacted prior to the Arcambel decision,34 Congress did not
legitimate the American Rule completely until 1853, when it enacted leg-
islation standardizing the costs that parties could recover in litigation.35
Any litigation costs not mentioned expressly in the statute could not be
33. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263. Indeed, there are situations in which Congress has cho-
sen to award attorneys' fees, but this does not mean that courts have independent author-
ity to award attorneys' fees in those situations which judges decide to promote the public
policy behind an important statute absent legislative authority. Id. In fact, the situations
in which attorneys' fees may be granted are completely within the discretion of the United
States legislature, and therefore courts must follow congressional guidance in determining
the situations in which recovery of attorneys' fees is appropriate. Id. at 263-64.
34. See id. at 248 n.19 (outlining statutes allowing, and not allowing, recovery of attor-
neys' fees). Legislation dating prior to the Arcambel decision indicates that American ju-
risprudence was to refrain from rewarding attorneys' fees. Id.
On March 1, 1793, Congress enacted a general provision governing the award-
ing of costs to prevailing parties in federal courts: . . . This provision was to be in
force for one year and then to the end of the next session of Congress ..., but it
was continued in effect in 1795, Act of Feb. 25, 1795, c. 28, 1 Stat. 419, and again
in 1796, Act of Mar. 31, 1796, 1 Stat. 451, for a period of two years and then until
the end of the next session of Congress; at that point, it expired.
Id. at 248-49 n.19 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 251-52. In an attempt to standardize the costs allowable in federal legisla-
tion, Congress passed the "Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161." Id. at 251-53. The Act
limited counsel fees collectible from the losing party to the amounts expressly stated in the
Act. Id. at 252. The Act was far-reaching in specifying the amount of attorneys' fees that
could be charged to a losing party. Id. The Act extensively and specifically detailed the
nature and amount of fees charged to losing parties. Id. The Act was not intended to limit
the amount an attorney could charge his clients, but, rather was meant to limit counsel
fees collectible from the losing party. Id. The Act states the following:
In a trial before a jury, in civil and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a
final hearing in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars: Provided, That
in cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the libellant shall recover
less than fifty dollars, the docket fee of his proctor shall be but ten dollars.
"In cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury, ten dollars, and
five dollars where a cause is discontinued.
"For scire facias and other proceedings on recognizances, five dollars.
"For each deposition taken and admitted as evidence in the cause, two dollars
and fifty cents.
"A compensation of five dollars shall be allowed for the services rendered in
cases removed from a district to a circuit court by writ of error or appeal ...."
Id. at 253 n.25 (quoting the Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161-62). The American Rule was
a negative implication of the Act and its amendments because the Act only stated those
costs which could be recovered during litigation, and was silent on those which could not.
Id.
1995]
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recovered.36 Over the years, Congress enacted a plethora of legislation
allowing specifically for the recovery of attorneys' fees. 37 Adhering to
the precedent it established in Arcambel, the Supreme Court has avoided,
with very few exceptions, 38 interpreting ambiguous or non-explicit statu-
tory language to allow the award of attorneys' fees. 39  The Supreme
Court more recently reinforced its deference to the American Rule in
1976 in its ruling in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. °
Recognized as the beginning of modern attorneys' fee jurisprudence,
the Alyeska Court stated that the American Rule is ingrained in the judi-
cial history of the United States.4 ' It would be inappropriate, the Court
argued, to invade the legislative function of Congress by judicially deter-
mining when to permit an award of attorneys' fees.42 The Court further
explained, however, that despite its allegiance to the American Rule, it
has recognized several exceptions which allow recovery of reasonable at-
torneys' fees.
43
36. See id. at 253-57 (citing cases supporting the American Rule). As the Court stated
in The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8. Wall.) 377 (1869), "in lieu of the compensation now allowed
by law to attorneys .... no other compensation shall be allowed." Id. at 392.
37. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33 (citing statutes). Some of the many statutory exam-
ples of congressional discretion in awarding attorneys' fees include: Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988
& Supp. V 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972,42
U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1988).
38. See infra note 43 (detailing exceptions to the American Rule); Eric D. Kaplan,
Note, Attorney Fee Recovery Pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B), 42 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 251, 267-68 (1992) (discussing one of the few exceptions to the
American Rule developed by the Supreme Court).
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (listing cases that have denied recovery
of attorneys' fees since the Supreme Court's Arcambel decision).
40. 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1976) (holding attorneys' fees not recoverable without specific
congressional authorization). "
41. Id. at 271. The Supreme Court stated that the rule followed by American courts
with respect to not allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees has survived. Id.; see also
Kaplan, supra note 38, at 266-67 (stating that the American Rule "has prevailed and is now
well entrenched in American jurisprudence").
42. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262. The Court stated that the American Rule "is deeply
rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legisla-
ture's province by redistributing litigation costs." Id. at 271.
43. Id. at 259. The Court stated that there unquestionably exists situations in which
the judiciary may assert its inherent power to award attorneys' fees, but that in Alyeska
none of the exceptional circumstances were present to allow for recovery. Id. For exam-
ple, the Court has found it within its power to grant attorneys' fees when such compensa-
tion would create equity among the litigants. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527,
535-36 (1882) (establishing that 1853 Act did not interfere with the historic power of equity
to recover costs, including attorneys' fees). The Court has also found it within its power to
award attorneys' fees where a party is willfully not in compliance with an order of the
court. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) (holding
that when there is willful disobedience of a court order the Court may award reasonable
1995] Attorneys' Fees under CERCLA
While Congress has not dismissed the Court's creation of certain lim-
ited exceptions to the American Rule,4 neither has the Court viewed
itself as holding the unlimited power to allow fee shifting among litigants
whenever it deems the award of attorneys' fees warranted.45 In fact, one
year after Alyeska was decided, the Court, in Runyon v. McCrary,46 ef-
fectively put to rest the issue of attorneys' fees under the American
Rule.4 7 In Runyon, the Court reiterated that the traditional rule in the
United States is that attorneys' fees may only be collected, but for several
well-entrenched exceptions, when the statute in question calls for their
recovery explicitly.4 8 Otherwise, courts simply may not award them.
49
The Supreme Court's rulings in Alyeska and Runyon, that attorneys'
fees are not recoverable absent express statutory authorization, failed to
prevent conflict and confusion among the circuits regarding the recover-
ability of attorneys' fees under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). 50 The
confusion is, no doubt, attributable partly to the poorly drafted language
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, as the "punishment for contempt ... is in the discre-
tion of the court"). Finally, if the losing litigant has acted in bad faith, maliciously, or for
oppressive purposes, the court may award attorneys' fees. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (recognizing that the defendant
could be required to pay attorneys' fees if it "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons").
44. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 (stating that "Congress has not repudiated the judicially
fashioned exceptions to the general rule").
45. See id. at 260 (limiting discretion of courts to award attorneys' fees to when the
statute is explicit on the issue of fee recovery); supra note 33 (discussing limits on court
authority to allow fee recovery).
46. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
47. See id. at 185.
48. Id. Echoing Alyeska, the Court in Runyon stated that "the law of the United
States, but for a few well-recognized exceptions not present in these cases, has always been
that absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost
of litigation." (footnote omitted).
49. Id.
50. Compare General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991); Hastings Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp. 228, 233
(W.D. Mich. 1993) (same); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron &-Metal
Co., 814 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same); BTR Dunlop, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., No. 90-C-7414, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1720, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1993) (same);
Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); Pease & Curren
Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 952 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (same) with Fallowfield
Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. Civ.A. 89-8644, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6233, at *57 (E.D. Pa.
May 11, 1993) (denying recovery of attorneys' fees); United States v. Hardage, 750 F.
Supp. 1460, 1502 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (same); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57, 66
(D.N.H. 1990) (same); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 709
(D.N.J. 1988) (same).
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of CERCLA, particularly sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 101(25). 51 Section
107(a)(4)(B) states that a party shall be liable for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan.",52 Section 101(25), when amended by SARA in
1986,53 expanded the original meaning of "response" to include any "en-
forcement activities related thereto., 54 SARA's ambiguous language did
little to resolve the confusion concerning the recovery of attorneys' fees
under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).55  The Conference Committee,
commenting on the SARA amendments, failed to clarify the issue.56
Although the Committee stated that response costs are recoverable from
responsible parties, the House Conference Committee Report failed to
distinguish between private and government parties. 7 This lack of clarity
left the federal circuits with the task of resolving the issue.
51. See Michael B. Jones, Comment, The Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under CER-
CLA: Are They "Costs of Response" for Private Litigants?, 11 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
261, 279 (1992) (noting the difficulty of interpreting CERCLA); see also Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "the legislative history of
CERCLA is vague, reflecting the compromise nature of the legislation eventually en-
acted"); Bulk Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(detailing the enactment of CERCLA during the 96th session of Congress, and stating that
"CERCLA's legislative history is riddled with uncertainty because lawmakers hastily
drafted the bill, and because last minute compromises forced changes that went largely
unexplained"); City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(stating that Congress passed "a severely diminished piece of compromise legislation from
which a number of significant features were deleted"), recons. denied, 14 ENrVTL. L. REP.
20007 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
52. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (outlining the costs re-
coverable from other PRPs in private party cost recovery actions).
53. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(e), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986).
54. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988) (broadening the types of costs
recoverable by private parties in litigation against other PRPs by adding the non-specific
term "enforcement activities").
55. Id. The addition of the phrase "and enforcement activities related thereto" to the
term "response" in CERCLA § 101(25) was seen as an express grant to the EPA (a gov-
ernment party) to recover its attorneys' fees in actions taken against responsible parties.
However, it cannot be said to preclude similar recovery from private parties as explicitly.
See H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2848-49 (describing modification to language in CERCLA relating to "response
action").
56. H.R. CorN'. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3278.
57. Id. The Conference failed to distinguish between the government or private par-
ties by confirming only that "[response costs] are recoverable from responsible parties, as
removal or remedial costs under section 107." Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Short Circuited - The Conflict Among the Federal Circuits
Regarding CERCLA Section 107(a) (4) (B)
Several appellate courts addressed whether attorneys' fees are recover-
able under CERCLA before the issue's resolution in Key Tronic.58 Ini-
tially, these circuit courts viewed the recovery of attorneys' fees as both
provided for explicitly in the language of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B)
and consistent with the policy reasons behind the legislation's enact-
ment.59 The tide changed, however, as other circuits reached a polar con-
clusion, despite utilizing an analysis identical to that which opposing
circuit courts used in their contradictory decisions.6"
1. The Eighth and Sixth Circuits Allow Attorneys' Fees Under
CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(B)
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in General
Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems 61 that attorneys' fees
are recoverable "response" costs under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).62
In reaching this conclusion, the court used a two-pronged approach.63
First, the court focused on the language of the statute itself.64 Second,
the court reviewed the policy justifications underlying CERCLA.65
Litton Industries owned and operated a typewriter plant which
dumped cyanide-based electroplating wastes, sludge, and other pollutants
onto the land surrounding the plant.66 After the plant closed, Litton sold
58. See FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 842,848 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding only
non-litigation fees may be recoverable); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934
(1st Cir.) (finding litigation fees not recoverable), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993);
Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir.) (finding fees recoverable), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 636 (1993); Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding litigation fees not recoverable); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automa-
tion Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding fees recoverable), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 937 (1991).
59. See, e.g., General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422 (holding attorneys' fees are a recoverable
response cost before any other circuits addressed issue); Donahey, 987 F.2d at 1256 (al-
lowing recovery of attorneys' fees).
60. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (outlining the circuit courts to ad-
dress the issue of attorneys' fee recovery and their holdings).
61. 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991).
62. Id. at 1422 (holding language of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) explicitly grants recov-
ery of attorneys' fees).
63. See id. at 1421-22 (analyzing the language of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(b) and the
policy behind the legislation's enactment, the court concluded that attorneys' fees are re-
coverable response costs).
64. Id. at 1422. The court also reviewed the guidelines found in the Code of Federal
Regulations describing how to conduct a "removal action." Id. at 1419-21.
65. Id. at 1422 (arguing it would defeat the purpose of CERCLA to deny recovery of
attorneys' fees).
66. Id. at 1416.
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it and the surrounding land to General Electric, who was charged with
the cleanup of the contamination Litton caused.67 General Electric then
brought an action against Litton to recover the cleanup costs. 68 '
In concluding that the language of the statute explicitly allowed for the
recovery of attorneys' fees, as the American Rule requires, the Litton
court focused its analysis on the term "response" as defined by the
Superfund Amendments made to CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) in
1986.69 The Superfund Amendments expanded the term "response,"
originally defined as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action," to
include "enforcement activities related thereto., 7° The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that attorneys' fees are an inevitable cost of "enforcement activ-
ities" as defined by SARA, therefore they must be included as CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(B) "necessary costs of response."
'7 1
The Eighth Circuit concluded that CERCLA contained a "sufficient
degree of explicitness" to allow for'the recovery of attorneys' fees. 72 The
court buttressed its position by stating that its holding advanced the pur-
poses behind CERCLA - prompt cleanup of contaminated sites and im-
67. Id. at 1416-17.
68. Id. at 1417.
69. Id. at 1422. The statute defines "response" to include the term "enforcement ac-
tivities." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 185 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3278. The Conference failed to
distinguish between governmental or private parties by confirming only that "[response
costs] are recoverable from responsible parties, as removal or remedial costs under section
107." Id.
70. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1998), as amended by Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). There are
conflicting viewpoints as to whether the addition of the term "enforcement activities" is a
confirmation of Congress' desire to preclude recovery of attorneys' fees to private parties.
Kanad S. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.: Are
Attorney Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Actions?, 75 MINN. L. REr.
1541, 1558 (1991) (stating that Congress' failure to differentiate between government and
private litigants is not dispositive on whether attorneys' fees are recoverable by private
parties under § 107(a)(4)(B)); Mark Atlas, From T & E Industries to General Electric v.
Litton: Private Party Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under CERCLA, 21 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENvrL. L. INST.) 10, 206 (1991) (articulating the lack of consensus on the issue of whether
attorneys' fees are recoverable under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B)).
71. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1421-22; see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1985). The ma-
jority in General Electric stated "[a]ttorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in
this kind of enforcement activity and it would strain the statutory language to the breaking
point to read them out of the 'necessary costs' that section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private
parties to recover." General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422.
72. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422 (concluding that to find otherwise would strain the
language of § 107(a)(4)(B) beyond the breaking point and create an unnecessary obstacle
for the recovery of attorneys' fees).
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position of the cost of cleanup on responsible parties.73 Not allowing for
the recovery of such fees, the court reasoned, would serve as a disincen-
tive to clean contaminated sites because litigation costs for contribution
actions often approach or exceed the original cost of cleanup.74 The
court further opined that denying a party the attorneys' fees associated
with litigation effectively prevents the rapid cleanup of hazardously con-
taminated sites because no entity will shoulder the cleanup cost volunta-
rily for fear that such cost will not be recoverable. 75 Litton, the loser,
applied for certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied its request.
76
Three years passed before the issue again reached the federal appellate
level, this time in the Sixth Circuit.77 In Donahey v. Bogle, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit resolved the issue of attorneys' fees in much
the manner as the Eighth Circuit had in General Electric.78 Bogle leased
property for a term of twenty years to the St. Claire Rubber Company.79
Throughout most of the twenty-year lease period, St. Claire used the land
to dump and burn sludge created at its plant.80 Upon completion of the
lease, Bogle sold the land to Donahey, who, after state notification, un-
dertook the task of cleaning up the contamination St. Claire caused. 81
The court in Donahey, analyzing the reasoning of previous district and
appellate courts,' determined that Congress had created an exception to
73. Id. Other cases also recognize that one of CERCLA's main purposes is to admin-
ister liability on the parties responsible and make those parties pay for the cost of cleanup.
E.g., Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831 (D. Vt. 1988), rescinded in part, vacated
in part, claim dismissed, 31 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) (1814) (D. Vt. 1989); United States v.
Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985); Pin Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
74. See General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1422 (stating it would undermine the purposes of
CERCLA to allow non-polluters such as General Electric to pay for cleanup, and then not
be reimbursed for the cost of bringing litigation to recover the response costs, and that this
would serve as a disincentive to clean hazardously contaminated sites).
75. See id.
76. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 499 U.S. 937 (1991) (de-
nying certiorari).
77. Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 (1993).
78. See id. at 1256 (relying on the language of § 107(a)(4)(B) and legislative purposes
of CERCLA to determine whether attorneys' fees are recoverable).
79. Id. at 1252.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1252. All parties in this case were private; there was no formal state or
federal action against the former or present landowners. See id. Donahey tried to recover
his cleanup costs under CERCLA, and rescind his purchase contract for the property
under state law. Id. at 1253.
82. Id. at 1256 (citing Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991));
Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); General Elec. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991). In particular, the Donahey court focused on the Bolin opinion which stated that
Congress enacted § 107(a)(4)(B) to provide an incentive for cleanup, and that denying the
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the American Rule by creating a private cause of action for the recovery
of "necessary expenses. '83 Hence, allowing the recovery of attorneys'
fees as "necessary expenses" complied with the American Rule.84 In ad-
dition, the Donahey court focused on the purposes of CERCLA and as-
serted that Congress intended section 107 to serve as an incentive for
both the federal government and private individuals to assume the cost of
response initially, thereby promoting the prompt cleanup of hazardously
contaminated sites. 85 The Sixth Circuit stated that the denial of attor-
neys' fees in private party response recovery actions would surely defeat
the prompt cleanup of waste sites because PRPs would not shoulder will-
ingly the heavy financial burdens that cleanup of waste sites and subse-
quent litigation entail.86 This approach to attorneys' fees under
CERCLA was short-lived, however, because the remaining circuits to ad-
dress the issue reached a contrary conclusion.
87
2. Private Parties Pay the Price - Attorneys' Fees Denied in Three
Circuits
The issue of whether attorneys' fees are recoverable under CERCLA
section 107(a)(4)(B) surfaced in different circuits three other times in
1993, but these circuit courts scrutinized the language of CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) more closely than their Sixth and Eighth Circuit coun-
terparts.88 These circuits concluded that Congress neither authorized
explicitly nor intended implicitly to award attorneys' fees to private par-
recovery of attorneys' fees is a guaranteed way of defeating the efficient cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites. Id. (citing Bolin).
83. Id. (quoting Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (enti-
tling private parties to bring an action to recover "necessary" expenses from other respon-
sible parties).
84. Donahey, 987 F.2d at 1256. Congress provided "parties with a federal cause of
action for the recovery of necessary expenses in the cleanup of hazardous wastes." Id.
(quoting Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
85. See Donahey, 987 F.2d at 1256 (citing Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710).
86. See id. (stating that there is "no surer method to defeat this purpose than to re-
quire private parties to shoulder the financial burden of the very litigation that is necessary
to recover these costs") (quoting Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 710).
87. See FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 848 (10th Cir. 1993) (only non-
litigation attorneys' fees may be recoverable); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915,
934 (1st Cir.) (finding litigation fees not recoverable), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993);
Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).
88. See supra note 87 (citing the circuits that disallowed recovery of attorneys' fees).
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits found § 107(a)(4)(B) explicit enough to allow for private
parties to recover attorneys' fees, while the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits decided that
recovery of such fees requires something more explicit. See supra notes 13-14 and accom-
panying text.
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ties as part of response costs associated with cleaning hazardously con-
taminated sites.89
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Stanton Road Associates
v. Lohrey Enterprises,90 was the first federal appellate court to create
conflict among the circuits over the recoverability of attorneys' fees.9
Stanton Road Associates owned property adjacent to Lohrey Enter-
prises.9' While operating its dry cleaning plant, Lohrey spilled the haz-
ardous chemical perchlorethelene and thereby contaminated Stanton
Road's property.93 Stanton Road then sued Lohrey Enterprises to re-
cover the response costs under CERCLA.94
Using two lines of reasoning, the Stanton Road court concluded that
the language of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) did not call for the award
of attorneys' fees expressly, as the American Rule requires.95 First, the
court reasoned that because CERCLA permits recovery of attorneys'
fees expressly in other sections of the Act,96 Congress clearly had the
ability to provide specifically for the recovery of attorneys' fees under
section 107(a)(4)(B). 97 Second, the court pointed to the disagreement
among the district courts, both in the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, as a solid
indication that the language of section 107(a)(4)(B) was ambiguous, and
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
found CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) did not meet the American Rule's requirement of explicit-
ness as set out by Alyeska and Runyon. See id.
90. 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
91. Compare Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1015 (decided January 28, 1993) with In re
Hemingway Transp., 993 F.2d at 915 (decided May 4, 1993) and FMC Corp., 998 F.2d at
842 (10th Cir. 1993) (decided July 9, 1993).
92. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1016.
93. Id. Lohrey shared an alley adjacent to Stanton Road, and spilled hazardous chem-
icals which found their way onto Stanton Road's property. Id.
94. Id. At trial undisputed evidence was introduced that estimated the cost of the
cleanup at over one million dollars. Id. at 1017.
95. See id. at 1018-20 (arguing that both the existence of more explicit sections which
do allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees and the disagreement among various courts
addressing the issue of attorneys' fee recoverability suggest that § 107(a)(4)(B) is not suffi-
ciently explicit to permit recovery of attorneys' fees under the American Rule).
96. See, e.g., CERCLA § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659() (1988) (authorizing courts to
"award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the...
prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate"); CERCLA
§ 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988) (providing the "President may undertake such plan-
ning, legal, fiscal.... investigations.., to plan and direct response actions [and] to recover
the costs thereof").
97. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1019 (stating that "Congress has repeatedly demon-
strated that it knows how to express its intention to create an exception to the American
Rule").
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 45:311
therefore, contrary to the American Rule's requirement of clear and spe-
cific statutory authorization sanctioning the recovery of attorneys' fees.98
In this two-pronged analysis, the Ninth Circuit discarded as a secon-
dary issue whether the allowance of attorneys' fees bolstered the pur-
poses underlying CERCLA.99 The court explained that such an analysis
would be irrelevant because the language of the statute did not provide
explicitly for recovery of attorneys' fees.' 0 The Stanton Road court did
agree with the Eighth Circuit's determination that attorneys' fees inevita-
bly are incurred in a private response action. 10' The Ninth Circuit noted,
however, that under the American Rule the cost of litigation cannot be
redirected to others merely because the positive residual effect of doing
so enhances public policy. 102 The Stanton Road court explained that
although reading CERCLA to allow such fee shifting would support the
purposes behind the legislation, a court cannot usurp the legislature's
power to make policy decisions by implying an authority to award attor-
neys' fees.
10 3
In In re Hemingway Transportation, Inc.,"' the First Circuit also re-
jected the recovery of attorneys' fees under section 107(a)(4)(B). °5 The
98. Id. The Stanton Road court stated that:
the fact that those district courts that have confronted this issue disagree on the
question whether attorneys' fees are allowable under section 101(25) and
107(a)(4)(B) demonstrates that the words 'enforcement activities' do not explic-
itly signal, with any persuasive degree of clarity, that Congress intended to pro-
vide for an award of attorneys' fees to private litigants.
Id.; see e.g., BTR Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. 90-C-7414, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1720, at *1-2 (N.D. 11. Feb. 12, 1993) (allowing recovery); Price v. United States Navy, 818
F. Supp. 1326, 1331 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (denying recovery of attorneys' fees); Sante Fe
Pac. Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 696 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (same); Pease &
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 950-51 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing
recovery).
99. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020 (stating that the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gen-
eral Electric to rely "on the policy underlying CERCLA to support its conclusion that
Congress must have intended that litigants may recover attorneys' fees in a private re-
sponse action ... is misplaced").
100. See id. (implying that to award attorneys' fees to enhance public policy is contrary
to the Supreme Court's rulings in Alyeska and Runyon); see also supra text accompanying
notes 28-57 (discussing the American Rule as it was developed by the Supreme Court in
Alyeska and Runyon).
101. Stanton Road, 984 F.2d at 1020 (agreeing with the "Eighth Circuit that attorneys'
fees are ordinarily expended in a private response action").
102. Id. (stating that the "cost of representation cannot be shifted by implication under
the American Rule").
103. Id. The Ninth Circuit succinctly stated, "[w]e cannot imply authority to award
attorneys' fees because we determine that such a rule would enhance public policy. The
Supreme Court rejected this notion in Alyeska." Id.
104. 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993).
105. Id. at 934.
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first part of the court's analysis mirrored that of the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Stanton Road. As in Stanton Road, the Hemingway court reviewed
other sections of CERCLA and found "explicit provisions authorizing at-
torney fee awards in certain other types of actions.' 10 6 The Hemingway
court reasoned that these explicit provisions prevented the courts from
assuming that Congress designed less specific provisions of CERCLA,
such as section 107(a)(4)(B), to allow for the recovery of attorneys'
fees. 107  If Congress intended to allow recovery under section
107(a)(4)(B), the court maintained, it would have drafted the provision
with equally explicit language.
10 8
In addition, the First Circuit analyzed SARA, and reasoned that Con-
gress had the opportunity to clarify its intention with regard to the award
of attorneys' fees when it passed the Superfund Amendments in 1986.109
In adding the non-specific phrase "enforcement activities," the court rea-
soned that Congress consciously "elected not to authorize attorney fee
awards in [section 107(a)(4)(B)] actions."'10 The First Circuit concluded
that despite the strong argument that allowing attorneys' fees promotes
CERCLA's remedial aims, it is not proper for a court, without legislative
guidance, to consider certain statutes more important than others."' Al-
lowing the recovery of litigation fees when they are not expressly delega-
ble by the statute grants too much power to the courts.
12
The last circuit to address attorney fees recovery was the Tenth Circuit
in FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc..113 FMC brought an action to re-
cover response costs it incurred in cleaning up the soil contamination that
106. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1988) (prevailing private parties are entitled to re-
cover the costs of litigation, "including reasonable attorney.., fees") and 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610(c) (1988) (stating that "all costs and expenses (including the attorneys' fees)" are
recoverable in actions involving employee-whistleblowers)).
107. See id. (concluding CERCLA's inclusion of explicit provisions authorizing rewards
of attorneys' fees in other types of actions indicates that "Congress did not consider" or
include a similar attorneys' fee award provision in § 107(a)(4)(B)).
108. See id. Absent express legislative authority, a prevailing party will not be allowed
to recover attorneys' fees. Id. Therefore, because § 107(a)(4)(B) is not as explicit as other
sections of CERCLA, Congress did not intend for attorneys' fees to be recoverable under
it. Id.
109. Id. (stating that SARA's purposeful omission of an explicit provision allowing for
recovery of attorneys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(B) indicates that Congress elected not to
authorize awards in private party response recovery actions).
110. See id. at 934-35 (acknowledging that awarding attorneys' fee may well promote
the remedial aims of efficient cleanup and placing the liability on the responsible party, but
noting that such a determination is one for the legislative venue, not the judiciary).
111. Id. at 935.
112. See id. (deciding that whether to award attorneys' fees is not a question to be
decided in the judicial venue).
113. 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993).
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the operation of Aero Industries' chemical facility had caused.114 Follow-
ing the emerging trend other circuits developed, the FMC court refused
to recognize an express grant of litigation fee recovery in the CERCLA
term "enforcement activities.' 15 As in the other cases denying recovery
of attorneys' fees under section 107(a)(4)(B), the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged that allowing such recovery would further the social goals of CER-
CLA.116 The court stated, however, that despite the potential positive
result of fee shifting, Alyeska mandated that attorneys' fees may not be
awarded without an explicit delineation from Congress. 17
II. KEY TRONIC CLOSES THE DOOR ON ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER
SECriON 107(A)(4)(B)
In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States," 8 the issue of attorney fee recov-
ery under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) was finally ripe for Supreme
Court adjudication, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Decem-
ber of 1993."' Key Tronic attempted to recover 1.2 million dollars in
response costs, including attorneys' fees, from the Air Force and other
PRPs.12° First, Key Tronic sought recovery of the attorney costs associ-
ated with its identification of the other PRPs.' 21 Second, Key Tronic
wanted to recover funds it expended on attorneys while organizing and
negotiating its settlement agreement with the EPA.' 22 Finally, Key
Tronic sought recovery for the cost of the ensuing litigation between itself
and the United States Air Force and other responsible parties.123
114. Id. at 844-45. The property was bought at an auction by Aero Industries, who did
not investigate the environmental conditions of the property despite their knowledge that
the plant had been used as an arsenic refining facility. Id. at 844.
115. Id. at 847. The court recognized the split among the circuits on the issue of attor-
neys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(B) by citing the decisions of Donahey, General Electric, Stan-
ton Road, and Hemingway, but said that it simply could not "agree with those courts
[Donahey and General Electric] that find an explicit authorization for the award of litiga-
tion fees from the fact that response costs include related enforcement activities." Id.
116. Id.; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing CERCLA's
purposes).
117. FMC, 998 F.2d at 847 (stating that "[tihe desirability of a fee-shifting provision
cannot substitute for the express authorization mandated by the Supreme Court" in
Alyeska).
118. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
119. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1994).
120. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1963. The costs were incurred by Key Tronic to clean
liquid chemicals disposed of in a landfill which contaminated the local water supply. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. key Tronic had agreed to contribute $4.2 million into a cleanup fund in it's
settlement with the EPA. Id.
123. Id.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Washington and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, hearing Key Tronic's claim, had
split on the issue of attorneys' fees.' 24 The district court had construed
CERCLA liberally to achieve the general objectives of the Act, viewing
all three types of legal services as recoverable "response" costs.' 25 The
court of appeals, however, followed its earlier reasoning in Stanton Road
and denied Key Tronic's request for recovery of any of the three types of
attorneys' fees.126
With the issues in Key Tronic clearly established by the lower courts,
the Supreme Court sought to settle the split among the circuit courts on
whether attorneys' fees are recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(B) of
CERCLA. 1 7 The majority opinion applied the American Rule as out-
lined in Alyeska and Runyon.128 It explained that these two decisions
require that the legislature expressly and specifically provide for the
award of attorneys' fees, and that it would not construe any statutory
provision not meeting this burden to allow for the recovery of attorneys'
fees. 1 29 After scrutinizing the language of the provision, the majority
concluded that section 107(a)(4)(B) did not meet the threshold of preci-
sion the American Rule required.' 30 In contrast, the dissent argued that
the majority read the Alyeska/Runyon line of cases too narrowly, and, as
a result, required more than statutory explicitness.1
3 1
124. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying
recovery of all three types of attorneys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F. Supp.
865, 872-73 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (allowing recovery of all three types of attorneys' fees at
issue in the case), rev'd, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1993).
125. Key Tronic, 766 F. Supp. at 872 (construing § 107(a)(4)(B) and § 101(25) "liberally
to achieve the overall objectives of the statute").
126. Key Tronic, 984 F.2d at 1027-28 (prohibiting the recovery of attorneys' fees by
interpreting "necessary response costs" so as to exclude attorneys' fees (citing Stanton
Road, 984 F.2d at 1020)); see also supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (detailing the
three types of attorneys' fees Key Tronic sought to recover).
127. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (1994).
128. Id. at 1965; see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976) (stating that "the law
of the United States, but for a few well-recognized exceptions ... has always been that
absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost of
litigation") (footnote omitted); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 247 (1975) (holding attorneys' fees not recoverable without specific congressional
authorization).
129. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
130. Id. at 1966-68 (holding that recovery of attorneys fees is not explicitly required by
the term "necessary costs of response" in § 107(a)(4)(B)).
131. Id. at 1968-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority rule required the
inclusion of "magic words" in the statute, not just an express authorization).
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A. The Majority: Section 107(a)(4)(B) is Insufficiently Clear Under the
American Rule
The Key Tronic majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, 132 de-
scribed the statutory basis for private party cost recovery actions under
CERCLA. 133 The Supreme Court first observed that prior to SARA, no
express provision existed allowing a private cause of action to recover
cleanup costs, but that district courts had interpreted section 107(a)(4)(B)
consistently to create such a right.134 Justice Stevens noted that, although
the Superfund Amendments created an express right to seek contribution
under section 113(f) of CERCLA,135 SARA did not grant a right to con-
tribution explicitly under section 107.136 At most, SARA implied such a
right by using language in section 107 in connection with the language in
section 113 - which presupposed that a right to a civil cause of action
existed under section 107.137 After discussing the history and develop-
ment of private rights of action under CERCLA, the Court provided
132. Id. at 1962. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter and
Ginsburg joined in the majority opinion.
133. Id. at 1965 (considering the statutory basis for private party cost recovery actions
and the effect of SARA on that legislative basis).
134. Id. at 1965-66. The Court quoted from the opinion in Walls v. Waste Resource
Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985), which stated that "District Court decisions have
been virtually unanimous in holding that section 9607(a)(4)(B) creates a private right of
action against section 9607(a) responsible parties." Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965 n.7.
135. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965; see CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)
(1988) (allowing parties to seek contribution).
136. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66. Section 9607(a) states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section...
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of
(4) shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). According to the Court in Key Tronic, this language indicates
no explicit grant of a private cause of action. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966; see also Bryan
E. Keyt, Comment, Searching for Methods of Conducting Efficient CERCLA Litigation:
The Argument in Support of Attorneys' Fee Awards in Section 107 Private Cost Recovery
Litigation, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1029, 1032-33 (1993) (stating how CERCLA's ambiguities
have increased the cost and difficulty of cleanup, and how the statute contains no explicit
statement on liability, or how to recover cleanup costs).
137. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66; see also Keyt, supra note 136, at 1032 (dis-
cussing how CERCLA § 113 in conjunction with § 107 deals with apportioning liability for
cleanup among responsible parties).
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three reasons for its decision to deny attorneys' fees, all of which rested
on the American Rule's requirement of statutory explicitness.
138
First, although the Supreme Court acknowledged the generally ac-
cepted view that section 107 of CERCLA implies the ability of a private
party to bring a cost recovery action, the Court reasoned that it would be
erroneous to imply further that section 107 allows the recovery of attor-
neys' fees, given the statutory clarity Alyeska and Runyon require. 39
Certainly, the Court reasoned, a provision that does not even explicitly
permit a private cause of action for contribution cannot be found to state
expressly that attorneys' fees are recoverable by the prevailing party in
such actions. 140 Second, Congress included in its SARA amendments to
CERCLA two provisions that allow the award of attorneys' fees ex-
pressly, but did not set forth similar provisions in sections 113 or 107.1"
The Court maintained that such a purposeful omission forcefully suggests
a deliberate intention by Congress not to authorize the recovery of legal
fees associated with private party cost recovery litigation.'14  Finally, the
Supreme Court reasoned that if it included attorneys' fees within the
scope of the "response" costs that private parties are entitled to recover
under section 107, it would be stretching the definition of "enforcement
activities" too far.143 The Court concluded that the term "is not suffi-
ciently explicit to embody a private action under § 107 to recover" such
costs of cleanup. 144
Despite its conclusion that litigation-related costs are not recoverable
under section 107, the majority stressed that a private party could recover
some payments it makes to an attorney in the course of cleaning hazard-
138. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-67. The three reasons the majority gave for denying
recovery of attorneys' fees were: (1) the language of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) was not as
explicit as Alyeska required; (2) SARA amended several other provisions of CERCLA to
allow expressly for recovery of attorneys' fees, but did not do the same for § 107(a)(4)(B);
and (3) it would "stretch" the meaning of "enforcement activities" too far to include attor-
neys' fees as a recoverable "response" under § 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 1966-67.
139. Id. at 1966-67; see also supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
140. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (discussing the development of the American
Rule denying recovery of attorneys' fees unless there is a clear mandate in the statute).
141. Id. at 1966-67 (stating that "[t]o conclude that a provision [§ 107(a)(4)(B)] that
only impliedly authorizes suit nonetheless provides for attorney's fees with the clarity re-
quired by Alyeska would be unusual if not unprecedented").
142. Id. at 1967.
143. Id.
144. Id. Curiously the Supreme Court refused to comment on why the same phrase,
"enforcement activities," provides the government with the right to recover attorneys' fees,
but yet is not explicit enough to grant similar recovery to private parties under
§ 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA. Id.
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ously contaminated sites.' 45 The fact that a lawyer performs work associ-
ated with the effective cleanup of a site, rather than a scientist or an
environmental engineer, for example, is not dispositive of whether the fee
for such work is recoverable. 46 In order for the work conducted by a
lawyer to be considered a non-recoverable cost, it must be associated spe-
cifically with the role and function of an attorney.147 The Court found
that work outside of litigation and negotiation could be done by a lawyer
as well as an engineer, chemist, or other professional. 48 For this reason,
the Court granted Key Tronic's request for reimbursement of fees associ-
ated with the identification of other PRPs. 1 49 The Court denied, how-
ever, the recovery of the cost for negotiating the settlement with the EPA
because it viewed such work as being performed traditionally by
attorneys. 150
B. The Dissent: No Magic Words Required to Grant Attorneys' Fees
Under Section 107(a)(4)(B)
Justice Scalia began his dissenting opinion' 5 ' in Key Tronic by disagree-
ing with the majority's finding that a private cause of action for the recov-
ery of response costs is merely implied by section 107(a)(4)(B). 1'52 Justice
Scalia found no other way to interpret the language of section
107(a)(4)(B), which states that "[c]overed persons... shall be liable for
145. Id. The majority proclaimed that "[tihe conclusion we reach with respect to litiga-
tion-related fees does not signify that all payments that happen to be made to a lawyer are
unrecoverable expenses under CERCLA." Id. For example, if a lawyer is hired to identify
other PRPs, to conduct scientific analysis and environmental assessment, or to perform
some other activity that substantially benefits the cleanup effort of a hazardous waste site,
then the costs incurred for using a lawyer to perform this function will be recoverable. See
id. The reason is that these types of activities serve a purpose apart from the simple reallo-
cation of costs associated with litigation fee-shifting. See id.
146. Id. (stating that the work of some lawyers "that is closely tied to the actual cleanup
may constitute a necessary cost of response in and of itself under the terms of
§ 107(a)(4)(B)"). These might include identifying other responsible parties, or assessing
the extent of environmental damage at a particular site.
147. See id. (reasoning that legal work that can solely be done by a lawyer is not recov-
erable). An example of a non-recoverable attorneys' fee is representing a client in
litigation.
148. Id. at 1967-68 (distinguishing recoverable services from non-recoverable services).
149. Id. at 1967 (reasoning that work done in connection with the identification of other
PRPs falls into the category of recoverable response costs).
150. Id. at 1968 (stating that the earlier-stated rationale regarding work which may also
be done by other professionals does not extend to work done by lawyers in connection
with litigation and negotiation).
151. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Thomas. Id.
152. Id. (arguing that the statute expressly creates such a cause of action).
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... necessary costs of response incurred by any other person,"' 53 than as
an express creation of a cause of action.154 He argued that the majority
would accept section 107(a)(4)(B) as creating an explicit cause of action
only if it contained the exact words "cause of action."' 55 Justice Scalia
argued that the majority's view that section 107(a)(4)(B) fails to offer
private parties an express right of action exhibits a "confusion between a
requirement of explicitness and a requirement of a password."' 56 After
establishing this position, Justice Scalia rebutted the three reasons the
majority proffered for its denial of attorney's fees associated with
litigation.' 57
Justice Scalia argued that the first line of reasoning the majority ad-
vanced displayed a confusion over the American Rule's requirement of
explicitness similar to the confusion the court exhibited with regard to
CERCLA's creation of a cause of action under section 107(a)(4)(B). 5 8
He agreed with the majority's statement that Alyeska and Runyon re-
quire explicitness, but argued that explicitness need not require the incan-
tation of the "magic phrase 'attorney's fees.' "1" Rather, he maintained,
Congress explicitly authorized the recovery of costs relating to "enforce-
ment activities," and because such costs primarily consist of attorneys'
fees, the statute meets the explicitness requirement of the American
Rule. 6 °
Next, the dissent turned to the majority's second argument that the
existence of more specific provisions within CERCLA allowing for the
recovery of attorneys' fees indicates both a purposeful omission of simi-
larly specific language in section 107(a)(4)(B) and a lack of intent to al-
153. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
154. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that
"Section 107(a)(4)(B) states, as clearly as can be, that '[c]overed persons.., shall be liable
for... necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.' Surely to say that A shall
be liable to B is the express creation of a right of action." Id. (emphasis in original).
155. Id. Justice Scalia reasoned that the majority's "assumption seems to be that only a
statute that uses the very term 'cause of action' can create an 'express' cause of action." Id.
156. Id. at 1969. By arguing that the majority required a "password," Justice Scalia
meant that they would only allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees if the statutory provi-
sion included the specific term "attorneys' fees." See id.
157. Id. at 1968-69.
158. See id at 1969 (arguing that the majority misread the Alyeska and Runyon re-
quirement of explicitness necessary to counter the American Rule).
159. Id.
160. Id. (arguing that attorneys' fees are naturally a part of the term "enforcement
activities" and therefore recoverable as a "necessary" cost of response). The dissent ar-
gued that Runyon required only that the statute be explicit enough to evince an intention
on behalf of Congress to provide for recovery of such fees, not the inclusion of a specific
reference to "attorney's fees." Id.
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low for recovery of attorneys' fees under the same.16 Justice Scalia
refuted this argument by reasserting the "magic words" reasoning he
used to reject the majority's first justification.162 He reasoned that Con-
gress' use of the term "attorney's fees" in two other provisions of CER-
CLA is irrelevant in determining whether section 107(a)(4)(B) allows for
their recovery. 163 Justice Scalia maintained that this argument would be
persuasive only if the language of section 107(a)(4)(B) was ambiguous."6
As he had argued previously, the language of section 107(a)(4)(B) pro-
vides explicitly for attorneys' fee recovery through its employment of the
phrase "enforcement activities," therefore the fact that the statute uses
more specific language elsewhere is of little relevance in determining
whether section 107(a)(4)(B) also allows for recovery.16  Justice Scalia
classified the majority's second line of reasoning as nothing more than "a
watered-down version of the 'magic words' argument.'
166
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's contention that "enforce-
ment activities" is sufficiently specific to allow the government to recover
its litigation fees, but not private parties.' 67 Justice Scalia recognized that
"enforcement" normally is an activity associated with the executive
power of a state or federal government in prosecutions. 68 Pointing to
the manner in which attorneys often use the term "enforcement" in civil
litigation, he argued against its exclusive reference to formal government
action.' 69 Justice Scalia concluded that limiting the meaning of "enforce-
161. Id.; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing that, in light of what
the Supreme Court said in Alyeska, it is unusual to interpret non-specific language as au-
thorizing recovery of attorneys' fees).
162. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned that
the omission of the phrase "attorney's fees" would be persuasive only in arguing that
§ 107(a)(4)(B) does not allow for the recovery of litigation fees, if there was not an equally
express authorization for recovery. Id. Justice Scalia argued that is not the case here,
however, because Congress included the term "enforcement activities." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. Only if the Court's previous argument about the explicitness of "enforcement
activities" was valid would the existence of more explicit sections be persuasive, "[b]ut
since it is not, the fact that Congress provided for the recovery of attorney's fees eo nomine
in two other sections is of little relevance." Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The majority reasoned that the phrase "enforcement activities" in § 107 was
sufficiently clear to allow for the government to recover it attorneys' fees, but did not offer
an explanation as to why the same phrase was insufficiently clear to allow similar recovery
to private parties. Id. at 1967.
168. Id. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the term 'enforcement' often -
perhaps even usually - is used in connection with government prosecution").
169. Id. (stating that the use of the term enforcement "clearly includes the assertion of
a valid private claim against another private litigant. Lawyers regularly speak of . . . 'en-
forcing' a private judgement"). The dissent pointed out that the Court had recognized that
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ment" to actions brought by the government would be incorrect and in-
consistent with the term's usage in the legal profession.17 °
III. INTERNAL ANOMALY, CERCLA LANGUAGE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY ENCOURAGE INTERPRETING ATTORNEYS' FEES AS A
RECOVERABLE RESPONSE COST
Despite the majority's position on the recoverability of attorneys' fees
under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B), significant flaws in the Supreme
Court's reasoning suggest that CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) should be
interpreted to allow private parties reimbursement of their litigation
costs.17 1 In implying that the government is entitled to recovery, yet de-
nying the same privilege to private litigants, the majority overlooks three
significant ramifications which illustrate weaknesses in its reasoning.1
72
First, the Court's approach creates an internal anomaly regarding the
award of attorneys' fees.' 73 Second, the Court overlooks the double-
edged implication of relying on statutory explicitness to determine the
recoverability of litigation fees. Third, the Court ignores a strong public
policy rationale supporting the grant of attorneys' fees in private party
response actions. 174 The importance of these implications, neglected by
the majority in Key Tronic, indicates that section 107(a)(4)(B) should be
construed to permit the recovery of attorneys' fees.' 7 5
A. Internal Anomaly - Different Treatment Between the Government
and Private Parties
When the Court in Key Tronic held that private party recovery of attor-
neys' fees tenuously stretches the limits of the phrase "enforcement activ-
Congress created private rights in the Clayton Act which have served as " 'vehicle[s] for
private enforcement.' " Id. (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104,
109 (1986) (emphasis added)).
170. Id. (arguing to read the term "enforcement activity" to include both private and
government and to "cover the attorney's fees incurred by both the government and private
plaintiffs successfully seeking cost recovery under § 9607 of CERCLA").
171. See id. at 1965-67 (stating the majority's rationale for denying private parties re-
covery of attorneys' fees). The majority opinion in Key Tronic relied on Alyeska and Run-
yon to conclude that the language of § 107(a)(4)(B) did not, as required by the American
Rule, expressly authorize the recovery of attorneys' fees. Id.; see supra notes 28-57 and
accompanying text (discussing the American Rule's requirement that a statute explicitly
authorize recovery of attorneys' fees).
172. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67. The majority reasoned that it would be unprece-
dented to read the recovery of attorneys' fees into a provision that only impliedly autho-
rizes a private cause of action. Id.
173. See infra part III.A.
174. See infra part III.C.
175. See discussion infra notes 172-233 and accompanying text.
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ities," it also passively endorsed government recovery of attorneys' fee
under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(A). 76 The Supreme Court accom-
plished this endorsement by implying, without comment, its approval of
the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical
Co. ("NEPACCO ,,).177
The NEPACCO court had held that the government is entitled to the
recovery of its attorneys' fees under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).' 78
The NEPACCO court recognized that CERCLA section 104(b)(1) allows
the government to recover attorneys' fees which influenced and rein-
forced its belief that section 107(a)(4)(A) was sufficiently explicit to grant
the government recovery of attorneys' fees under its provision. 179 The
Supreme Court in Key Tronic, however, did not apply the rationale the
176. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965. The majority attempted to rationalize the gov-
ernment's ability to recover its litigation fees, stating that "[t]hough we offer no comment
on the extent to which that phrase ["enforcement activities"] forms the basis for the Gov-
ernment's recovery of attorney's fees through § 107, the term 'enforcement activity' is not
sufficiently explicit to embody a private action under § 107 to recover cleanup costs." Id. at
1967 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 630-31
(D.N.H. 1988) (allowing the government to recover its attorneys' fees); United States v.
Ottati & Goss, 694 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1988) (same), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 900
F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
177. See id. at 1966 n.9 (citing U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579
F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (concluding, pre-SARA, that the federal government
may recover attorneys' fees), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) and
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating
that there is an explicit grant for a private cause of action under § 107(a)(4)(B)).
178. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851. The NEPACCO court interpreted the language
of § 107(a)(4)(A) loosely and used the existence of another CERCLA provision that ex-
pressly allows for the government to recover attorneys' fees to influence its decision to
allow government parties to recover under § 107(a)(4)(A). Id. In particular, the
NEPACCO court utilized the connection between the language in § 104(b) and § 101(23)
to conclude that "legal" costs were recoverable under the terms of § 107(a)(4)(A). Id.
179. Id. see K.K. Du Vivier & Carolyn L. Buchholz, Attorney Fees as Superfund Re-
sponse Costs, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 34 (1991). In describing the reasoning the
NEPACCO court used, Du Vivier & Buchholz state:
In determining that CERCLA specifically allows the federal government to re-
cover attorney fees, the NEPACCO court first examined section 107(a)(4)(A)
and the definition of 'remove' or 'removal' under section 101(23). The connec-
tion to the language in section 104(b) addressing 'legal' costs was established only
through a reference to section 104(b) in the definition for 'remove' and 'removal'
in section 101(23).
Attorneys' Fees under CERCLA
NEPACCO court developed 180 to section 107(a)(4)(B)."' The inconsis-
tent treatment of government and private parties seems peculiar because
the comparative styled reasoning - existence of express recovery provi-
sions elsewhere in CERCLA - used to deny private parties recovery of
attorneys' fees under section 107(a)(4)(B) in Key Tronic is precisely the
same reasoning which created the government's entitlement to attorneys'
fees under section 107(a)(4)(A) in NEPACCO.'82 The inconsistency be-
comes even more acute when one analyzes the substantially similar lan-
guage between subsections (A) and (B) of section 107(a)(4). 183
180. The NEPACCO court began by reading § 107(a)(4)(A) very broadly so as to in-
clude the recovery of attorneys' fees. NEPACCO, 571 F. Supp. at 851. In its analysis, the
court stated that "[i]f Congress had intended otherwise, they would have merely stated in
section 107(a)(4)(A), 'all reasonable costs,' instead of the present language of 'all costs.' "
Id. The NEPACCO court justified its reasoning by reading CERCLA § 104(b)(1), a sec-
tion that allows the government to recover its attorneys' fees, contemporaneously with
§ 107(a)(4)(A). Id. See Du Vivier & Buchholz, supra note 179, at 34 (stating that "[i]t is
well established that the federal government can recover its attorney fees as response costs.
This conclusion is based upon section 104(b)(1) of CERCLA"); J. Christopher Jordan,
Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Private Contribution Actions Pursuant to CERCLA
Section 107(a)(4)(B), 10 REv. LIG. 823, 829 (1991) (stating that the court in NEPACCO
relied on § 104(b)(1) in reasoning that CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) allows for the recovery of
attorneys' fees). Section 104(b)(1) essentially states that the President of the United States
may undertake such legal studies or investigations needed to plan response actions, and
"recover the costs thereof" to enforce the provisions of CERCLA. See CERCLA
§ 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (1988). Although it is unclear whether § 104(b)(1) al-
lows for the recovery of the cost of investigation or the actual response action, the
NEPACCO court held that § 104(b)(1) allows the government to recover its litigation
costs. See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851. Note that "[t]he term 'thereof' in § 104(b)(1)
refers to costs of the studies and investigations, not the costs of response actions," making
it seem as if the NEPACCO court erroneously concluded that attorneys' fees are rewarded
to governmental parties under § 107(a)(4)(A). See Jordan, supra note 180, at 829 (stating
that the NEPACCO court relied on § 104(b)(1) as part of its determination that attorneys'
fees are recoverable by government parties).
181. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-67. In Key Tronic, the Supreme Court refused
to engage in the same kind of statutory arithmetic that the NEPACCO court used to allow
the government recovery of its attorneys' fees. See id.
182. Compare NEPACCO, 571 F. Supp. at 851 (allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees
for governmental parties by reading CERCLA § 107(A)(4)(A) language broadly and in
conjunction with § 104(B)(1) which does allow for recovery of attorneys' fees by govern-
mental parties) with Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (denying recovery of attorneys' fees
to private parties by reading § 107(a)(4)(B) language narrowly and interpreting different
provisions in CERCLA).
183. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). Section 107(a)(4) states
in relevant part that a person shall be liable for: "(A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not incon-
sistent with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response in-
curred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. The only
relevant difference is that sub-section (A) uses "all costs" while (B) uses "necessary costs."
Id. The term "necessary," unlike its counterpart in subsection (A), could limit recovery,
but because it is impossible to bring a response recovery action without incurring the cost
1995]
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The majority in Key Tronic, citing the existence of separate and express
recovery provisions for attorneys' fees within CERCLA,'184 refused to al-
low these provisions to influence the recovery of attorneys' fees by pri-
vate parties under section 107(a)(4)(B). 185 Courts do, however, read
these separate statutory provisions in conjunction with one another to
grant government parties recovery of attorneys' fees. 186 Permitting this
type of synthesis to grant recovery by government parties under section
107, as the NEPACCO court did and as the Supreme Court endorsed in
Key Tronic implicitly,187 while prohibiting the same practice for private
party litigants, is inconsistent. 188
of attorneys' and other fees associated with litigation, the limiting definition is counter-
acted by the practical realities of bringing a lawsuit. See id.; see also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v.
Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with the 8th Circuit that
attorneys' fees are normally incurred in private party response actions); General Elec. Co.
v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1421-22 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
attorneys' fees are necessarily incurred in cost recovery actions and that the litigation costs
easily approach and often exceed the actual cost of cleanup), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991); Jones, supra note 51, at 264-65 (quoting General Electric regarding the necessity of
incurring attorneys' fees when bringing an enforcement action against another party); Jor-
dan, supra note 180, at 834 (stating that contribution litigation to recover response costs
involve substantial costs).
184. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (interpreting strictly Alyeska's requirement of
"explicit statutory authority" to mean the inclusion of the term "attorney's fees"); see also
supra note 96 (providing examples of CERCLA provisions that expressly allow recovery of
attorneys' fees).
185. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (reasoning that the existence of separate provisions
which do allow for recovery of attorneys' fees indicates that they are not to be read in
conjunction with one another to allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees under
§ 107(a)(4)(B)); See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating an absence of lan-
guage in § 107(a)(4)(A) explicitly creating a cause of action); see also In re Hemingway
Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 934 (1st Cir.) (concluding that Congress had the opportunity to
include an attorney fee amendment to § 107(a)(4)(B), but chose not to do so, and refusing
to read explicit CERCLA sections (e.g. § 110(c)) as authorizing recovery under
§ 107(a)(4)(B)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 461 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that litigation expenses are
not recoverable as response costs).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (reading other sections of CERCLA in conjunction with
§ 107 in order to enable governmental parties to recover their attorneys' fees), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1981). Other
cases allowing the government to recover its attorneys fees include United States v. Mot-
tolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 631 (D.N.H. 1988), and United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.,
685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd, 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), and cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
187. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (stating that it offered no comment as to why
government parties are allowed to recover litigation fees, yet not denying the practice).
188. Compare id. at 1965-67 (holding attorneys' fees not recoverable by private parties
in response recovery actions under § 107(a)(4)(B)) with NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851
(allowing governmental parties to recover attorneys' fees); see also Du Vivier & Buchholz,
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Key Tronic stated that litigation fees cannot be recovered under section
107(a)(4)(B) because that provision does not specifically allow for such
recovery.89 In so holding, the Court read into the American Rule the
requirement that the specific provision of a statute which creates the
cause of action, rather than the synthesis of an act's provisions, must
explicitly authorize recovery of attorneys' fees.' 90 However, the
NEPACCO court engaged in, and the Key Tronic Court tacitly approved,
exactly this type of statutory arithmetic to create the government's right
to recover attorneys' fees under section 107(a)(4)(A).' 9' Therefore, if the
Supreme Court allows this practice under section 107(a)(4)(A), it cannot
logically forbid the same practice under section 107(a)(4)(B).
The Court further perpetuated the statutory anomaly it created be-
tween the government and private parties by refusing to adhere to the
plain meaning of the language of sections 107(a)(4)(A) and (B).192 Sub-
section (A) holds a party liable for "all costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan."'193 Subsection
supra, note 179, at 34 (stating that it is well established that government parties may re-
cover attorneys' fees as response costs).
189. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1966-67 (stating that attorneys' fees are not recoverable
because § 107(a)(4)(B) does not expressly call for them); see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 185 (1976) (requiring specific congressional authorization to allow recovery of attor-
neys' fees); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (re-
quiring legislative guidance to allow recovery of attorneys' fees).
190. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967. The requirement of an express authorization by
statute for the award of attorneys' fees precludes combining separate provisions of a stat-
ute to authorize such an award. See id. at 1966-67. Although the synthesis approach
clearly was rejected by the Supreme Court with regard to private parties, it has been used
by several courts to allow government parties recovery of attorneys' fees under
§ 107(a)(4)(A).
191. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (acknowledging government's authority to re-
cover legal fees); supra note 179 and accompanying text (reviewing court's analysis). Note
that nowhere in the language of § 107(a)(4)(A) does it expressly say that the government is
entitled to recovery of its attorneys' fees. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
192. See Karen M. McGaffey, Denying Private Attorney Fee Recovery Under CERCLA:
Bad Law and Bad Policy, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 87, 94 (1993) (stating that a "court
should consider the plain meaning of the statutory language"). For cases discussing the
basic principles of statutory interpretation; see Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (stating that courts should consider the plain mean-
ing of statutes); Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that legislative purpose should be derived from ordinary meaning); Wilshire West-
wood Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
doctrine of last antecedent); Beisler v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th.Cir. 1987)
(stating that statutes should be interpreted so as to give effect to each word); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that courts should not
interpret statutes to frustrate the purposes underlying their enactment).
193. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
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(B) holds a responsible party liable for "any other necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person consistent with the national contin-
gency plan."'19 4 The only relevant difference between the two subsections
is that subsection (A) uses the term "all costs" and subsection (B) em-
ploys the phrase "necessary costs."' 95 This minute difference does not
warrant denying attorneys' fees to private parties, while allowing their
recovery to government parties.' 96 Furthermore, the majority provided
no justification for this anomaly. 197
An analysis of the plain meaning of the words that sections
107(a)(4)(A) and (B) use reveals a strong basis for extending attorneys'
fees to private parties. The term "necessary," means that which is obliga-
tory, essential or required. 198 The commencement of any response recov-
ery litigation requires one to incur the cost of an attorney. 199 Logically,
"all costs" implies any cost necessary to bring an action.2"' Therefore, if
194. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). Federal courts addressing whether
§ 107(a)(4)(B) allows recovery of attorneys' fees were divided. Compare Hastings Bldg.
Prods., Inc. v. National Aluminum Corp., 815 F. Supp. 228, 233 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (al-
lowing recovery); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F.
Supp. 1281, 1285 (E.D. Va. 1993) (same); Joy v. Louisiana Conference Ass'n of Seventh-
Day Adventists, No. Civ.A. 91-4025, 1992 WL 165670, at *3 (E.D. La. July 6, 1992) (same);
Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); Shapiro v.
Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Lykins v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 1594 (E.D. Ky.), recons. denied, 710 F. Supp. 1122
(E.D. Ky. 1988) (same) with Price v. United States Navy, 818 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 n.9 (S.D.
Cal. 1992) (same); Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 943, 947
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (disallowing recovery of attorneys' fees); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc. 739 F.
Supp. 57, 62-63 (D.N.H. 1990) (same); Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149
(D.R.I. 1989) (same); T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 (D.N.J.
1988) (same).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A),(B); see also Jordan, supra note 180, at 832 (stating
that the NEPACCO court did not distinguish between §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B)); McGaf-
fey, supra note 192, at 90-91 (comparing the language of §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B) and
finding no significant difference).
196. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (1994) (holding that private parties are barred
recovery of attorneys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(B), and not explaining why government par-
ties are not similarly barred under § 107(a)(4)(A)).
197. Id.; see supra note 176 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority in Key
Tronic offered no explanation for passively endorsing the recovery of attorneys' fees to
government parties).
198. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1200 (2d ed. 1983).
"Necessary" is defined as: "That [which] cannot be dispensed with: essential; indispensable
... that [which] must be done; mandatory; not voluntary; required." Id.
199. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1968 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A cost recovery action "is
the only 'enforcement activit[y]' [one] can conceivably conduct. Obviously, attorney's fees
will constitute the major portion of those enforcement costs." Id.
200. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1421-
22 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating attorneys' fees "necessarily are incurred in this kind of enforce-
ment activity"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 766 F.
Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (stating a private party may incur response costs which
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the Supreme Court is willing to interpret "all costs" in subsection (A) to
include attorneys' fees, it must also construe "necessary costs" in subsec-
tion (B) in the same manner.20 '
B. The Language of Section 107(a)(4)(B) Contains Sufficient Clarity to
Allow Recovery of Attorneys' Fees
In Key Tronic, the American Rule provided the basis for all three of
the majority's arguments.20 2 By interpreting the American Rule to de-
mand specific terminology explicitly demonstrating an intent to award at-
torneys' fees, the majority parted with the Court's previous
understanding of the rule as laid out in Alyeska and Runyon.2°3
In Alyeska and Runyon, the Supreme Court established clearly that,
absent express congressional authorization, attorneys' fees could not be
awarded.2" As the Court noted in Key Tronic, under this jurisprudence,
the absence of the specific term "attorneys' fees" is not enough, in itself,
to conclude that Congress did not intend the statute to allow for recovery
of such fees.2 5 Despite its own recognition of this principle, however,
the majority relied exclusively on the fact that section 107(a)(4)(B) does
not call expressly for the award of attorneys' fees in its decision to deny
the prevailing party in Key Tronic recovery of its attorneys' fees.20 6
The majority in Key Tronic supported its position by arguing that CER-
CLA's more explicit provisions demonstrate that Congress did not intend
include attorneys' fees for bringing the private party cost recovery action), rev'd, 984 F.2d
1025 (9th Cir. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994); see also supra note
194 and accompanying text (defining "necessary"). It seems clear from the plain meaning
of the term "necessary" that if legal assistance is required to mount a competent action
against other PRPs, attorneys' fees are by definition a necessary cost of the action.
201. Jordan, supra note 180, at 830 (stating that it seems counter-intuitive "to assert
that the lack of an express provision for recovery of attorneys' fees indicates congressional
intent to permit such recovery under subsection (A), but to prohibit such recovery under
subsection (B)").
202. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965-67. In ruling that CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) does
not allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees to private parties, the majority focused on the
term "enforcement activities" and concluded that, in light of the Court's adherence to the
American Rule, this language was not express authorization to reward attorneys' fees. Id.
at 1967.
203. See id. at 1965. The majority itself recognized that the "absence of specific refer-
ence to attorney's fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise evinces an intent to pro-
vide for such fees." Id. If the Court were to require more than language that evinces
congressional intent to reward attorneys' fees, the result would be, as Justice Scalia aptly
termed in his dissent, the incantation of "magic words" to create the recovery of attorneys'
fees. Id. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
205. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1965.
206. Id at 1967
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for private parties to recover such fees under section 107(a)(4)(B). 17
This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the fact that other sections
are more explicit does not negate the possibility that a less explicit section
allows for recovery of attorneys' fees. Instead, that several of CERCLA's
provisions expressly allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees actually
tends to increase the likelihood that Congress intended section
107(a)(4)(B) to do the same. z08 Second, because courts glean enough in-
tent from section 107(a)(4)(A) to grant the government recovery of its
attorneys' fees, 2°9  it would not stretch the language of section
107(a)(4)(B) improperly to allow private parties the same right to recov-
ery.21° In fact, given the substantial similarity between the two subsec-
tions, awarding attorneys' fees to private parties is statutorily
reasonable.2 n
Additionally, in interpreting the American Rule to require specific lan-
guage in order to allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees under section
107(a)(4)(B), the Key Tronic Court did not acknowledge the conse-
quences of employing such a strict explicitness requirement. That is, if
the majority in Key Tronic was willing to forgo the rule of strict explicit-
ness in subsection (A) of section 107(a)(4) for government parties,212 it
207. Id.
208. See CERCLA § 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (1988). It is widely accepted
that the federal government can recover its attorneys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(A) because
of this section. Du Vivier & Buchholz, supra note 179, at 34; see supra note 186 and ac-
companying text (listing in part, cases where government parties were allowed to recover
attorneys' fees).
209. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
851-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (creating the rationale by which government parties are entitled to
recover attorneys' fees), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), and cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
210. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). This Section states in
relevant part:
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities ... shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin-
gency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan.
Id. (emphasis added). If "all costs" evinces the intent that Congress intended to allow for
the recovery of attorneys' fees, "necessary costs" should evince the same congressional
intent. See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 851-52 (establishing the reasoning by which gov-
ernment parties are entitled to the recovery of attorneys' fees).
211. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
212. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (explaining that the court would not comment as
to why the government is allowed to recover its litigation fees).
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must do the same in subsection (B) for private parties.213 At first impres-
sion, this argument may seem without merit because, contrary to the rea-
soning in Key Tronic, the Court would be using the American Rule to
read a requirement of explicitness out of section 107(a)(4)(B).214 In Key
Tronic, the majority construed the American Rule's requirement of suffi-
cient clarity to mean unambiguous statutory authorization (i.e., the inclu-
sion of the phrase "attorney's fees").215 However, by implicitly treating
government parties differently than private parties on the issue of attor-
neys' fees, the Court ignored the Alyeska/Runyon requirement of statu-
tory explicitness with regard to section 107(a)(4)(A), and read out a
requirement of explicitness for government parties.216 Although the ma-
jority in Key Tronic misapplied the American Rule, it must apply its in-
terpretation consistently to each provision of section 107.217 The
Supreme Court cannot selectively misapply the American Rule.218
213. Although the cause of action which allows private parties to seek contribution is
statutorily based, the suit still should be governed by common law principles of equity and
fairness, which should persuade the Court to award private parties attorneys' fees. See
Keyt, supra note 136, at 1032-33; Elizabeth F. Mason, Comment, Contribution, Contribu-
tion Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA: Following Laskin's Lead, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 99-100 (1991) (discussing the equitable principles that under-
lie contribution actions); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text (scrutinizing the
language of § 107(a)(4)(B) reveals that it does not explicitly disallow recovery of attorneys'
fees).
214. See Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1967 (holding that CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) was not
specific enough to allow private parties recovery, noting that it did not include the term
"attorney's fees").
215. See id. at 1969 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia observed in his dissenting
opinion, the majority is requiring the incantation of the password "attorney's fees" in order
for the Court to evince congressional intent to allow recovery of litigation costs. Id.
216. See also id. at 1967 (endorsing the practice of awarding attorneys' fees to govern-
mental parties even though doing so requires combining separate provisions of CERCLA,
and § 107(a)(4)(A) does not expressly call for the award of such fees); see supra notes 176-
80 and accompanying text (explaining NEPACCO reasoning by which government parties
may recover attorneys' fees).
217. The Court in Key Tronic, despite requiring an explicit congressional authorization
to allow recovery of attorneys' fees, states that a statute need only include language that
discloses an intent on the behalf of Congress to award such fees. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at
1965. Therefore, the mere absence of the phrase "attorneys' fees" is not dispositive of
whether attorneys' fees are recoverable. Id.
218. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976) (establishing the precedent that
courts need express congressional authorization to allow the award of attorneys' fees);
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). The principle of
stare decisis will be severely damaged if courts are allowed to apply the American Rule
stringently when private parties are before the court, but apply it loosely when the govern-
ment stands before the court. See id. at 269-71.
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C. Public Policy: Persuasive Arguments for Allowing Recovery of
Attorneys' Fees Under Section 107(a)(4)(B)
Two strong public policy arguments highlight the negative implication
of the Court's holding in Key Tronic. First, because the party charged
with cleanup may not be responsible for the actual contamination of a
site, denying attorneys' fees to that party may be unjust.2 19 Second, the
denial of attorneys' fees frustrates the legislative purposes behind CER-
CLA's enactment 22° and destroys any incentive for PRPs to cooperate in
cleanup efforts or to settle recovery actions before litigation.221
In delegating the responsibility for cleaning a hazardously contami-
nated site under CERCLA, the EPA may select from a variety of par-
ties.222 The basis on which the EPA chooses a party depends little on the
degree of responsibility for the contamination. 223 Rather, this choice is
based on which party the EPA can locate most easily.224 This implies that
the EPA often charges the current owner with the responsibility of com-
mencing cleanup.22
5
219. Jordan, supra note 180, at 834. The author states that:
One can envision the frustration of parties who contributed minimally to the
wastes disposed at a particular site, but nevertheless receive response orders sim-
ply because the EPA identified them first.
If they invest the substantial resources necessary to prove apportionment
among defendants, but cannot recover their attorneys' fees for doing so, their
litigation expenses could easily exceed their proportionate share of the cleanup
costs.
Id.
220. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (outlining the purposes behind CERCLA
enactment).
221. Jones, supra note 51, at 261. The rate of cleanup will be sure to decrease "[i]f
landowners are forced to absorb their attorneys' fees incurred in recovering response costs
from the primary polluter, hazardous waste sites will most likely not be cleaned up
promptly or effectively and responsible parties will not have to pay their share of cleanup
costs which necessarily includes attorneys' fees." Id. at 277. If CERCLA is amended "to
allow fee awards[, it] would create incentives for private parties to undertake a response
action. By knowing that they will be able to recover fees when pursuing a response action
against other PRPs, private parties can better estimate whether they can afford a response
action." Keyt, supra note 136, at 1070.
222. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). Under the statutory
scheme set up by CERCLA, past and present owners and operators, as well as transport-
e.rs, are potentially liable for cleanup of a contaminated site. Id.
223. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 834 (explaining that a PRP often feels frustrated
when it receives response orders because the EPA may have simply identified that PRP
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CERCLA requires the selected PRP to clean the site before that party
may attempt to shift liability to other PRPs.22 6 This cleanup and removal
of hazardous substances often entails heavy financial burdens,227 but
CERCLA attempts to offset these cleanup costs by allowing for response
recovery actions under section 107(a)(4)(B). 228 After the Key Tronic de-
cision, an identified PRP has no motive to make use of the cause of action
created by section 107(a)(4)(B) because the cost of litigation often ex-
ceeds the party's proportionate share of the contamination.22 9 The po-
tential result of this patently unfair230 statutory plan is that a party who
may not be responsible for contaminating a site may have to bear the cost
of cleanup because it is either unable or unwilling to incur the additional
expense of recovery litigation.23'
Aside from creating equity among PRPs, the inclusion of attorneys'
fees as part of the recoverable response costs also would create several
positive cooperation incentives for the PRPs.232 First, there is the incen-
tive to settle response recovery actions prior to engaging in expensive and
time-consuming litigation.233 For example, a party, such as a transporter
226. See CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1988) (allowing actions to be
commenced "under section 9607 of this title for recovery of costs at any time after such
costs have been incurred") (emphasis added); see also Dickerson v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 834 F.2d 974, 977 (11th Cir. 1987) (construing § 113(h) to mean that courts
have no pre-enforcement review power to review EPA's cleanup orders).
227. See Exxon: Spill Pay-Out Won't Hurt Company, CHi. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1991, at 16.
For an example of the high cost of cleanup of environmental contamination, Exxon esti-
mated the cost of its cleanup at over $2 billion dollars. Id.
228. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); CERCLA
§ 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988).
229. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th
Cir. 1990) (noting that "[t]he litigation costs could easily approach or even exceed the
response costs, thereby serving as a disincentive to clean the site"), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
937 (1991); see also Jones, supra note 51, at 265 (citing General Electric for the idea that
litigation costs may exceed the cost of cleanup).
230. Jordan, supra note 180, at 833-34. Jordan, pointing to the dan, pointing to the
unfairness inherent in CERCLA, states:
A party who cleans the site and proves apportionment can then recover response
costs from the other responsible parties in a contribution suit. In the process,
however, that party may incur substantial, nonrecoverable legal fees. The ineq-
uity becomes especially acute when non-negligent or causally-remote parties bear
these costs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
231. Id. at 834. The system is unfair because "[i]f the parties are unable or unwilling to
incur the expense of multi-party contribution litigation, they are saddled with the entire
costs [sic] of cleanup. Either way, these parties will pay vastly more than their proportion-
ate share of the cleanup expenses." Id.
232. See Keyt, supra note 136, at 1070-71, 1075.
233. Id. at 1075. Allowing prevailing private parties to recover their attorneys' fees
would provide an important, practical, and obvious incentive for parties to settle a situa-
tion that could develop into extremely long and costly litigation. Id.
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of hazardous material, who contributes relatively little to the contamina-
tion of a site, but faces the possibility of a long and expensive court battle,
will settle early rather than confront the potential liability of litigation
costs, which far outweigh its proportionate share of the cleanup.234 Sec-
ond, permitting the recovery of attorneys' fees creates the incentive to
undertake a cleanup action.235
As previously discussed, CERCLA requires a party the EPA identifies
as a PRP to clean up the site before it can seek contribution from other
PRPs.236 If attorneys' fees are not a recoverable response cost, the party
is likely to delay commencing cleanup because that money, in effect, is
lost.237 If attorneys' fees may be recovered, however, a party will more
likely begin cleanup as soon as the EPA identifies them as a PRP in order
to obtain the right to a cause of action.238 These incentives will act to
further the legislative goals of CERCLA.23 9
234. Id.; see O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that de
minimis parties in contribution actions are offered the possibility of settling at low cost),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
235. Jordan, supra note 180, at 834. A potentially responsible party identified by the
EPA, realizing that they "may be subject to claims for attorneys' fees by other parties
would have an incentive to voluntarily contribute to the cleanup effort at the outset." Id.
236. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (explaining pre-enforcement review
bar).
237. Keyt, supra note 136, at 1074. A PRP will be very reluctant to expend the initial
expense of cleanup.
Because PRPs are only potentially responsible, the EPA typically pursues only a
few of the largest ones and attempts to force them to conduct a response action
... If they decide to participate in the ongoing action with the EPA, the company
may be held responsible for some or all of the EPA's transaction costs. But if
they decide not to participate, they may be sued later by PRPs that do participate
nand at that point would not be responsible for attorneys' fees. Thus, the private
party can save money by not participating and dragging out the cleanup process.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
238. See Keyt, supra note 136, at 1070; see also supra note 222 and accompanying text
(stating that an incentive to cleanup will be present because cleanup is a requisite step to
gaining a cost recovery cause of action).
239. See Jones, supra note 51, at 277. Allowing attorneys' fees under § 107(a)(4)(B)
will promote the policy reason behind CERCLA because "[i]f landowners are forced to
absorb their attorneys' fees incurred in recovering response costs from the primary pol-
luter, hazardous waste sites will most likely not be cleaned up promptly or effectively and
responsible parties will not have to pay their share of cleanup costs which necessarily in-
cludes attorneys' fees." Id. If they are allowed to recover their attorneys' fees, the oppo-
site will be true. See id. CERCLA's objective is to promote prompt cleanup of sites
determined to be hazardously contaminated and to place the cost of cleanup on the party
responsible of the contamination. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing pol-
icy behind CERCLA's enactment).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Key Tronic a lack of consensus existed among the circuit courts
as to whether attorneys' fees are a recoverable response cost under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B). The Supreme Court, in resolving the
conflict among circuits, concluded in Key Tronic that attorneys' fees are
not recoverable by private parties because section 107(a)(4)(B) does not
comply with the American Rule, in particular with the interpretation the
Alyeska and Runyon cases assert. Given the Court's desire to rely on this
staple of American jurisprudence, and the Court's own recognition that a
lack of specific reference to attorneys' fees does not negate ipso facto a
statute's intent to award such fees, the holding in Key Tronic seems erro-
neous. As the title of the Act itself suggests, one of the constituent ele-
ments of CERCLA is the notion of compensation. In refusing to extend
the language of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B) to allow private parties to
recover attorneys' fees, the Supreme Court is neglecting this important
component, and in the process severely undermining the legislative pur-
poses the statute aims to achieve.
In light of the Court's misconstruction and misapplication of the Amer-
ican Rule, and the negative effects that are likely to result from the
Court's holding in Key Tronic, Congress should enact specific legislation
to counteract the potential consequences flowing from the Key Tronic
decision.
Sergio I. Borgiotti
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